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GAIN FROM THE SALE OF AN INCOME
INTEREST IN A TRUST
DouglasA. Kahn*
A tax doctrine that is related to the anticipatory assignment of
income doctrine, but yet different from that doctrine is variously
referred to as the "substitute for ordinary income doctrine" or the
"anticipationof income doctrine." This latter doctrine arises on the sale
of an item. The test often utilized to determine whether that latter
doctrine applies is whether the sale of an item substantively represents
the receipt of a substitute for future income - i.e., are the proceeds of
the sale given "in lieu of" ordinary income that the seller would have
otherwise received at a later date. The "substitute for ordinary income"
concept is not only used to characterize the doctrine itself but also is
used to describe the test used to determine whether the doctrine applies.
One of the points made in this articleis that the "substitutefor ordinary
income" concept is useless as a test. Courts that have purported to apply
that concept recently have recognized that the concept is too broad,and
so they have fashioned standards to be applied to distinguish when the
doctrine is applicablefrom when it is not. The articlepoints out that it is
the standards themselves that are the tests, and the "substitute for
ordinary income" concept plays no role and is a distraction.Several of
the standards are discussed - especially the retention of a residual
intereststandard.
There is established authority that the doctrine does not apply to the
sale of a term interest in a trust when the seller does not retain any
interest in the trust; and therefore the seller will receive capital gain
treatment on such sales. Several courts have questioned that holding
recently; one of which suggested that the holding was no longer valid.
In this article, the author concludes that the holding is still valid and so
the gain from such sales is a capital gain. The author also defends
capital gain treatment for such sales of a term interest in a trust as
Paul G. Kauper Professor of Law, University of Michigan. The author thanks
Professor Jeffrey H. Kahn for his very helpful comments and criticisms.
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properunder tax policy considerations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Instead of assigning income to another person in the hope that the
income will be taxed to the assignee, a taxpayer might sell the right to
income in an attempt to convert ordinary income to capital gains and
to utilize his basis in the underlying property to offset some of the
amount realized. The doctrine that has been employed to prevent that
abuse has been given various names, one of which is the "substitute
for ordinary income" doctrine For reasons noted below, I prefer to
designate that doctrine as the "anticipation of income" doctrine; and I
will refer to the doctrine by that name throughout this article.
This article will focus on the question of whether gain recognized
on the sale of an income interest in a trust will qualify for capital gain
See, e.g., United States v. Maginnis, 356 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2004).
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treatment when the transferor does not retain a residual interest in the
transferred property. The principal obstacle to capital gain treatment
for such sales is the anticipation of income rule, and so a discussion of
that topic comprises a significant part of the article. In addition to
concluding that the sale of an income interest in a trust generally will
produce capital gain when the residual interest rule does not apply,
the article will address the question of whether capital gain treatment
for such sales conforms to the tax policy for allowing capital gain
treatment.
In determining whether the anticipation of income rule applies to
a specific circumstance, courts often purport to apply a "substitute for
ordinary income" test, which was advanced by the Supreme Court in
1941.2 It is the position of the author that that test serves no useful
purpose. Perhaps, the substitute for ordinary income doctrine should
be considered merely a synonym for the anticipation of income rule.
That is, it is a term to describe a consequence rather than a term for a
test or standard for determining when that consequence takes place.
II. SALE OF INCOME-PRODUCING PROPERTY

Any item of property is capable of producing income. If the sale
of all income-producing property were to constitute an anticipation of
income and thereby cause ordinary income treatment, it would extend
the rule too far and would virtually eliminate capital gain treatment.
Consequently, the sale of all of the rights to an item of property will
not be subject to that rule in most cases.
One circumstance in which the anticipation of income rule will
apply is when the sale of an item of property includes the right to
receive income that had already been earned.3 1n such circumstances,
part of the purchase price will be treated as having paid for that
earned income and so will be separated and treated as ordinary
income to the seller.4 Even in that latter case, the anticipation of
income doctrine will not always apply. The income earned on the
property generally has to have achieved an advanced stage for the rule
to apply.
Another application of the anticipation of income doctrine arises
when a taxpayer ("TP") sells an income interest in property and
retains a residual interest in it. The amount received in that situation

2

4

See Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
See Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
See, e.g., Storz v. Commissioner, 583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1978).
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will be treated as ordinary income.
III. RETENTION OF A RESIDUAL INTEREST

The residual interest principle refers to a situation where a TP
carves out and sells an income interest in property from a larger
property interest that the TP retains. For the principle to apply, the
TP must have retained a right to enjoy the interest from which the
sold portion was carved once that portion expires. Consequently, not
every carved out interest triggers the anticipation of income rule. Only
when the seller retains a residual interest in the very interest he sold
does the rule apply.6
A sale of a right to income from property in which the seller
reserves a residual interest, no matter how small that interest might
be, will be subject to the anticipation of income rule. The amount that
the seller receives from the sale will be treated as ordinary income; the
seller will not be permitted to use any of his basis in the property to
treat part of the purchase price as a recovery of capital.'
For example, If G owns stock in X Corporation, and if G sold to L
the right to dividends from the stock for the next fifteen years, the
entire amount that G received from L as payment for the right to the
dividends will be ordinary income to G. G's basis in the stock cannot
be used to reduce the amount of his gain on that sale, and G's basis in
the stock will not be changed by the sale.
In this example, G retained two residual interests in the income
interest that he sold to L, and either one would have been sufficient to
trigger the anticipation of income rule. Once the fifteen-year period in
which L is entitled to dividends from the stock expires, the subsequent
dividends from the stock will be paid to G. That right to the
subsequent income constitutes a retained residual interest in the
income interest that G sold to L. In addition, G retained the right to
receive the principle of the stock on its sale or redemption.
The landmark case for the residual interest rule is the Supreme
Court's decision in Lake. Let us examine that decision.
Lake involved five consolidated cases. The facts of one of those
cases are typical. The principal issue in that case concerned a transfer
of an oil payment right to an officer of the transferor to compensate

Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
6

See id.

Id.
8 Id.
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the officer for his services.9 This constituted a sale of the oil payment
right to the officer. An oil payment right is the right to a specified
amount of money to be paid out of a specified percentage of the oil
produced or the proceeds from the sale of that oil. In Lake, the oil
payment right was a stated amount to be paid out of 25% of the oil
attributable to the TP's interest.'o At the time of assignment, it could
be estimated with reasonable accuracy that the amount of the oil
payment right would be paid out in approximately three years, and it
actually was completed in a little more than three years. The
transferor retained the right to the oil produced from all of its interest
after the transferee had received the full amount of his oil payment
right.
While the opinion in Lake refers to the substitute for ordinary
income doctrine in concluding that the transferor recognized ordinary
income on the sale, the key to the decision in that case is that the
seller retained a residual interest in the property it transferred to the
12
officer. In footnote 5 of the Court's opinion, the Court quoted, with
apparent approval, a 1950 ruling of the Commissioner which
concluded that the sale of an oil payment right that extends over a
period that is less than the life of the depletable interest from which it
was carved will cause ordinary income to the seller; but the sale of an
oil payment right that constitutes the entire depletable interest of the
seller will cause capital gain to the seller. In other words, if the seller
retains a residual interest, he will have ordinary income, but if he
retains no residual interest he will have capital gain." This residual
interest rule is sometimes referred to as the "carved out interest" rule;
but the residual interest rule is a more precise designation.
Eleven years after Lake was decided, Congress changed the tax
treatment of the "sale" of a right to a production payment.14 Congress
concluded that the purported sale of such rights substantively was not
actually a sale but rather was the obtaining of a nonrecourse loan
secured by the mineral rights. Congress added section 636 to the
Internal Revenue Code ("Code") in 1969 to treat such transactions as
nonrecourse loans. As the Service has acknowledged, however, the
principles of the Lake decision remain applicable to other

9

Id. at 261.

10 Id. at 262.

" Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
12 Id. at
264.
1
14

Id. at 266.

I.R.C. § 636.
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circumstances in which the anticipation of income doctrine arises."
IV. "SUBSTITUTE FOR ORDINARY INCOME" DOCTRINE OR "IN LIEU
OF INCOME" TEST

Some courts have utilized a so-called "in lieu of" test or a
"substitute for ordinary income" doctrine for applying the
anticipation of income rule. The landmark case that adopted that
doctrine is Hort v. Commissioner. The doctrine purports to provide a
standard for determining whether all or part of the amount received
on a sale of a property interest is actually a substitute for all or some
of the income that the underlying property will produce." To the
extent that the payment received is deemed a substitute for ordinary
income to be produced by the property, it will be taxed as ordinary
income under the anticipation of income rule.
While many courts have purported to apply the substitute for
ordinary income doctrine, it actually is completely useless in
determining whether the anticipation of income rule is applicable to a
specific set of facts. Consider the following illustration, which is drawn
from the Hort case.
X owns an office building. Y is the principal tenant under a lease
expiring in ten years. Y desires to cancel the lease. X agrees to release
Y from the lease in consideration of Y's payment to X of $50,000.The
entire $50,000 is ordinary income to X; it was received by X in lieu of
the rent that Y otherwise would have had to pay.19
Why do I say that the in lieu of test is useless? The value of any
property is the present value of the income stream that the property is
deemed capable of producing. The outright sale of any property (for
example, corporate stock) can be seen as the sale of the income
stream that that property will produce. So the purchase price for any
property is a substitute for the income that the property can produce.
Obviously, the fact that the payment represents a substitute for the
future income that the property can produce does not prevent the
seller from qualifying for capital gain treatment and for utilizing his
basis in the property. If that were not so, there could be virtually no
circumstances that qualify for capital gains treatment. Recognizing
that the in lieu of test is too broad to be applied without modification,
I.R.S. Field Service Advisory, 1996 WL 33320880 (July 1, 1996).
313 U.S. 28 (1941).
See id. at 31.
Id. at 30-31.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8(b) (1960); Hort, 313 U.S. at 31-32.
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courts have applied standards to determine when the rule is to be
applied. 20
The better reason for treating X as having ordinary income on the
$50,000 receipt in this illustration is that X still owns the building and
thus continues to own the residual interest that will produce the future
income.
As we will see, if a life income beneficiary sells her entire life
income interest to an unrelated party, any gain or loss she recognizes
will be a capital gain or loss.21 The payment received clearly is given
for the income that the trust will produce since that is the only interest
that the seller has to sell. Nevertheless, since the seller did not retain
any residual interest in the property, the anticipation of income rule
does not apply. Consider another illustration.
X owned an apartment building, which was leased to Y for fifteen
years. X sold to Z for $30,000 his rights to receive annual rents from Y
under the lease, but X retained his residual interest in the building. X
recognized $30,000 in ordinary income from the "sale." The retention
of any residual interest by a seller will be sufficient to prevent the
22
seller from enjoying capital gains treatment or utilizing his basis.
V. SALE OF AN UNDIVIDED FRACTIONAL INTEREST

What if, instead of selling a right to income from property in
which the seller retains a residual interest, the seller were to sell an
undivided fraction of all of his interest in the property? In that case,
the anticipation of income rule will not apply. The seller will not have
retained a residual interest in the property that he sold to the
purchaser. This distinction is sometimes described by referring to the
sale with a retained residual interest as a sale of a horizontal slice of
the seller's property, whereas the sale of an undivided fractional share
of the property is described as a sale of a vertical slice of the seller's
property. Consider the following illustration.
F owns a commercial building, which is leased to N for fifteen
years. As noted above, if F sold to P the right to rents from the
property for the remainder of the term of the lease, the anticipation of
income rule would apply. Instead, F sells to P one-third of his interest
in the property including one-third of his right to collect rent under
the lease. The sale of that fractional interest is not substantively

20
21
22

See, e.g., Lattera v. Commissioner, 437 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 2006).
See infra Part VI.
Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 268 (1958).
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different from the situation where F sells all of his interest in the
property since, in both situations, F retains no residual interest in the
portion of the property sold to P. Consequently, the anticipation of
income rule is not applicable.
VI. SALE OF AN INCOME INTEREST WHERE No RESIDUAL INTEREST
Is RETAINED

If a TP sells his entire interest in an item of property, or a
fractional share of his entire interest, even if the TP's only interest is
an income interest, the anticipation of income rule ordinarily will not
apply. One possible exception to that exclusion might arise if the
income interest that the TP owns has only a very brief period
remaining.
The landmark case for this proposition is McAllister v.
Commissioner.2 3 In that case, the TP inherited a life income interest in
a trust.24 The TP sold her life income interest to the remainderman of
the trust.25 The case came to the Second Circuit to resolve two issues:
(1) in determining her gain or loss from the sale, should the TP be
allowed to use the basis she acquired in the life income interest under
the antecedent to Code section 1014 when she inherited that interest,
and (2) should the gain or loss that the TP recognized from the sale of
her life income interest be treated as a capital gain or loss. In a
majority opinion, the Second Circuit answered both questions in the
affirmative. The court held that TP could use her basis in the interest
to measure her gain or loss, and any gain or loss she had was a capital
gain or loss.26
Congress subsequently amended the Code to override the court's
determination that a TP could use her basis in determining gain or
loss on such sales. Subject to one exception, section 1001(e) disallows
the use of basis on the sale of a term interest if the basis was acquired
in accordance with section 1014, 1015, or 1041 (i.e. acquired from a
decedent, or by gift, or from a spouse).27 The one exception to that
rule is that the TP can use her basis if her sale of a term interest is part
of a transaction in which the entire interest in the property is
transferred to another person or persons.
23

157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946).

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 237.

27

I.R.C. §§ 1001(e), 1014, 1015, 1041.
I.R.C. § 1001(e)(3).

8
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Significantly, Congress did not pass any legislation altering the
Second Circuit's decision that the TP's gain or loss on the sale of a life
income interest is a capital gain or loss if the TP retains no residual
interest. Moreover, the Service has promulgated a Revenue Ruling
adopting the McAllister view that the sale of a life income interest
qualifies for capital gain treatment.29 Last, the congressional decision
to overturn one of the two holdings of the McAllister court and to
leave undisturbed the other holding of that decision constitutes an
implicit approval of the second holding.
In a number of recent cases, courts have uniformly held that when
the winner of a lottery that provides an annuity (i.e. the right to
receive annual payments over a specified period of years) sells the
right to subsequent annuity payments, the seller recognizes ordinary
income. 0 Those courts rested their decisions on the "substitute for
ordinary income" doctrine. In some of those cases, the sellers retained
a residual interest in the annuity, and in some they did not. As we will
see, the sellers will recognize ordinary income from such sales
regardless of whether they retain a residual interest.
Several of the courts that imposed ordinary income treatment on
the sale of the right to annuity payments questioned the current
vitality of the McAllister decision on capital gains on the ground that it
preceded Supreme Court cases adopting the substitute for ordinary
income test.32 That issue is discussed below in connection with the
discussion of the Lattera decision. Note, however, that the substitute
for ordinary income doctrine was first adopted by the Supreme Court
in 1941 in Hort," which predates McAllister by some five years and
indeed was cited by the Second Circuit in its opinion in McAllister.
One of the courts that dealt with the sale of the annuity payments,
the Third Circuit, expressly suggested that McAllister was wrongly
decided and is not good law today.3 The Lattera decision is worthy of
some discussion.

Rev. Rul. 72-243,1972-1 C.B. 233.
30 Prebola v. Commissioner, 482 F.3d 610, 611 (2d Cir. 2007); Lattera v.
Commissioner, 437 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 2006); Watkins v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 1269
(10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Maginnis, 356 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2004).
31 See infra Part
VII.
32 See, e.g., Clopton v. Commissioner,
87 T.C.M. 1217 (2004).
Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 29 (1941).
Lattera v. Commissioner, 437 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 2006).
29
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VII. THE LA TTERA DECISION
The facts of Lattera were that the taxpayers won a state lottery
having a value of more than nine million dollars. The winnings were
required to be paid in twenty-six annual installments. In other words,
the taxpayers received an annuity payable over a period of twenty-six
years., After receiving nine of the installments, the taxpayers sold
their right to the remaining seventeen installments for a lump sum of
over three million dollars." The taxpayers reported the sales price as a
long-term capital gain, listing their basis in the right to the installment
payments as zero. The Third Circuit sustained the Commissioner's
determination that the amount the taxpayers received was ordinary
income. 9 The result that the court reached is correct, but its reasoning
is faulty.
While ostensibly relying on the substitute for ordinary income
doctrine, the court correctly observed that the doctrine cannot be
applied indiscriminately or it would preclude capital gain treatment in
virtually all situations. 40 The court said that other standards had to be
employed to determine when the substitute for ordinary income
doctrine applied and when it did not.4 1 One fault with the Third
Circuit's decision lies with its use of the substitute for ordinary income
doctrine at all. Since, as the court acknowledged, virtually all sales
involve a substitute for future income, the standards that the court
says are to be used to distinguish when the doctrine applies are the
only standards that matter. In other words, the substitute for ordinary
income doctrine adds nothing to the analysis of the issue; the
standards ostensibly used to determine whether that doctrine applies
are the only standards to determine whether the anticipation of
income rule applies. The substitute for ordinary income doctrine has
no useful function and constitutes a distraction.
The Third Circuit said that it was not prepared to set forth an
exclusive list of the standards to be employed in determining whether
the substitute for ordinary income doctrine applied.42 It did, however,
list three standards that can be used.
" Id. at 401.
36

Id.

Id.
38

Id.

3

Id. at 410.
Lattera, 437 F.3d at 406.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 405.
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The first of the three standards that the court adopted is a
resemblance test.43 The court listed a number of items that have been
treated as capital assets and a number that have not to see if the right
to the installment payments looked more like one of the lists than the
other." The court concluded that the resemblance test was of no help
in that case because the right to the lottery installment payments does
not resemble items on either list.
The second standard is the well-established principle that if the
seller of a right to future income (a carved out interest) retains a
residual interest in that income or in the property that produces the
income, the seller will recognize ordinary income on the sale.45 Since
the taxpayers in Lattera had sold all of the interest they had in the
property, the residual interest rule did not apply. 46 The court therefore
turned to a third standard.
The third standard, like the resemblance test, requires an
examination of the character of the property that was sold to
determine whether it qualifies as a capital asset. 47 This third standard,
on which the court based its decision, rests on a distinction between
"earned income" and the right to earn income. While an earned
income distinction is proper if construed correctly, the court's
construction and use of that standard makes no sense.
The court concluded that only if the transferee of the right to the
income must do something further to earn the income can the seller
48
have capital gain treatment. The court determined that if the mere
ownership of property gives the owner the right to future income,
then the sale of the right to that income will be treated as a sale of
earned income and so be taxed as ordinary income. 49 The court said
that the right to the installments was earned by the taxpayers when
they won the lottery; nothing further needed to be done; and so their
sale of that right produced ordinary income.50
The problem with the court's opinion is its construction of
"earned income" for purposes of this issue. If the court's construction
were adopted, the sale of shares of stock would produce ordinary

43

Id. at 406.

" Id.
" Id. at 406-07.
4
Lattera, 437 F.3d at 409-10.
47
48

4
50

Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 408.
Id.
Id.
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income. As the court itself noted, a sale of stock typically produces a
capital gain. The court also noted that "a stock's value is the present
discounted value of the company's future profits."" Yet, on the sale of
stock, the purchaser obtains the right to future income (dividends)
solely by virtue of owning the stock; he need do nothing further to
obtain the dividends. The tax treatment of the sale of stock cannot be
reconciled with the construction of earned income that the court
adopted.
Moreover, the court concluded that its application of the earned
income distinction conflicts with the decision of the Second Circuit in
the McAllister case on the capital gain issue. The court dismissed that
decision in the following language: "We consider McAllister to be an
aberration, and we do not find it persuasive in our decision in this
case." 52 The court ignored the significance of the fact that Congress
changed the basis rule of the McAllister decision, but left unimpeded
the part of that decision that adopted the capital gain rule. The court
also ignored that the Service has promulgated a Revenue Ruling
adopting the McAllister view that such a sale produces capital gains.
Moreover, if the court had construed the "earned income" distinction
correctly, there would have been no conflict with the McAllister
decision, and the court would not have had to try to repudiate that
case.
The court's conclusion that the amount received for the sale of
the right to the installment payments was ordinary income to the
taxpayers is correct. The reason, however, is different from the
rationale adopted by the court.
When the taxpayers won the lottery, they received a property
right that had value. Why were they not taxed in that year for the
present value of the right to those payments? The apparent answer is
that the taxpayers likely are on the cash receipts and disbursements
method of accounting, as most individuals are. While there are
exceptions, an unfunded, nonnegotiable promise to make payments
generally does not qualify as cash or its equivalent. The taxpayers'
right to the installment payments was not taken into income in the
year they won because of the accounting system they use. Their right
to those annuity payments represented a kind of deferred income. As
one student commentator put it, the transaction effectively was kept

5
52
1

Id. at 404.
Lattera, 437 F.3d at 409.
Rev. Rul. 72-243, 1972-1 C.B. 233.
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open until the payments were received.54 The right to already earned
but deferred income is not a capital asset, and so the sale of that right
does not produce capital gain."
In applying the earned income test, the court should not have
made its decision turn on the fact that the purchaser did not have to
do anything to have the right to the future installment payments.
Mere ownership of property is not an obstacle to capital gain
treatment when the property itself will earn the income. A bond will
produce income because it represents a debt on which interest is
payable. A share of stock represents ownership in a corporation that
can produce income through the management of its business. The
owner of the bond or stock does not have to do anything to receive
that income, but that fact does not influence the tax treatment of a
sale of those items.
The earned income concept properly refers to a sale of the right
to income that had already been earned (i.e. produced) but had not
yet been taxable to the seller. It does not properly refer to income that
will be earned in the future that will be produced by the corpus itself
rather than by the efforts of the owner of the corpus. Lattera involved
the former situation so that the gain on the sale in that case properly
56
was treated as ordinary income. On the other hand, McAllister
involved the second situation; and so the Second Circuit's holding in
that case is not in conflict with the result reached in Lattera.
VIII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR TREATMENT OF GAIN FROM
THE SALE OF AN INCOME INTEREST INA TRUST
There are several rationales suggested for having preferential tax
treatment of net capital gains. Some commentators do not accept any
of those rationales, and so there is controversy as to whether the
current treatment is justified. Rather than to engage in that debate, I
will accept capital gains rates as a given and consider the question of
whether the sale of an income interest in a trust should qualify for that
treatment. Whatever the reason for preferential treatment might be,
the question arises whether the gain from the sale of an income
interest in a trust satisfies that purpose.
Matthew S. Levine, Comment, Lottery Winnings as Capital Gains, 114 YALE
L.J. 195,201 (2004).
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.61-7(d) (1966); Jaglom v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 847
(2d Cir. 1962).
Levine, supra note 54, at 201.
McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946).
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There is general agreement that capital gains treatment should be
reserved for recognized income that is attributable to the appreciation
of a capital asset. One argument raised against allowing capital gain
treatment for the sale of an income interest in a trust is that the
taxpayer's gain does not satisfy that condition. Let us examine that
contention.
Initially, consider the circumstance when an asset that is
universally accepted as a capital asset is sold for a gain. In Year One,
X buys one share of corporate stock for $100, and that is his basis. In
Year Six, X sells the stock for $1,000 and reports $900 long-term
capital gain. To what is the $900 appreciation attributable? The
appreciation in value of the stock is attributable to the belief in the
market that the stock will produce much greater dividend income than
was anticipated in Year One when the stock was purchased. X's $900
gain represents the present value of the additional future income
stream that the stock will produce. Yet, there is no question that X is
entitled to capital gain tax treatment.
Now, consider the sale of a term interest in a trust. Let us first
examine the sale of a term interest, which the seller had acquired by a
prior purchase.
L has a life income interest in a trust whose corpus has a value of
$1,000,000. The remainder interest is held by R. In Year One, the
value of L's life income interest is $400,000. In that year, B pays L
$400,000 to purchase her interest. B is not related to R. I will consider
the tax treatment of L later. For now, we will focus on the tax
treatment of B when subsequently, in Year Three, B sells the life
income interest to a third party for $450,000.
B's original basis in the life income interest (an interest for the life
of L) was $400,000." For the several years that B held the interest, B
would recognize income for the amount distributed to him from the
trust, and B would have taken a depreciation deduction for a portion
of his $400,000 basis. Note that B is not prevented by section 167(e) or
section 273 from taking a depreciation deduction since B is not related
to R and since B purchased the term interest.59 B's $400,000 basis in
the term interest will be reduced by the depreciation that was
allowable or allowed to B. B will report a gain equal to the excess of
the amount received over his basis in the term interest." The portion
of that gain equal to the depreciation deductions allowed to B will
58
5
6

See I.R.C. § 1012.
I.R.C. §§ 167(e), 273.
I.R.C. § 1001.
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constitute ordinary income under the recapture of depreciation rules.
The balance of B's gain, $50,000 here, will be a long-term capital gain.
To what is the appreciation in the value of B's life income interest
attributable? It represents the belief that the trust will produce more
income than was anticipated when B purchased the interest in Year
One. The anticipation of more income will also cause an increase in
the value of the assets held in the trust (i.e. the trust's assets have a
greater value because they are expected to produce more income). In
other words, the value of the trust's assets will have increased, and
consequentially the value of both the life income interest in the trust
and the remainder interest will increase. There will also be a reduction
of the value of the life income interest due to the exhaustion of two
years of L's life expectancy, but the size of the price paid for the life
income interest in Year Three shows that the increase in the value of
the trust's assets more than offset that decline in value. So, the
appreciation of B's interest in the trust is no different from the
appreciation of the stock that was examined above. Like the stock, the
income interest in the trust appreciated in value because of the
anticipation that the assets in the trust will produce more income.
There is no reason that the gain that B recognized on the sale of
that income interest, other than the recapture of depreciation
element, will not receive capital gain treatment.62 Note that two of the
courts that held ordinary income for the gain from the sale by lottery
winners of the right to installment payments explicitly declined to
express an opinion as to the tax treatment that should be accorded if
the purchaser of those rights to installment payments subsequently
63
sold them to a third party.
Any suggestion that gain from the sale of the entirety of a term
interest in a trust should be ordinary income because it is a sale of the
right to income is too broad. Even if the sale of some such term
interests should be so treated (and the author contends otherwise), it
is clear that there are term interests whose sale should produce capital
gain.
Next, let us consider the circumstance where a taxpayer inherits a
life income interest in a trust or receives a gift of such an interest.
61

I.R.C. § 1245.

62 Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation Tax Expenditure or Proper
Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1979) (questioning
whether the recapture of depreciation rules are consistent with good tax policy).
United States v. Maginnis, 356 F.3d 1179, 1183 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004); Clopton v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C.M. 1217, 1218 n.4 (2004).
6 McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946).
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Since the considerations are the same whether the income interest is
inherited or obtained as a gift, I will focus on an inheritance.
In Year One, D dies and leaves property having a value of
$1,000,000 in trust, the income of which is payable to L for life and the
corpus is to be distributed on L's death to R. None of the assets in the
trust are depreciable. L is the life income beneficiary, and R is the
remainderman. L and R are not related. Under section 1014 of the
Code, the basis of the property owned by the trust is $1,000,000 (the
value of that property at D's death). To determine the basis that L
and R have in their interests in the trust, the $1,000,000 basis of the
trust's corpus is allocated between L and R according to their
respective actuarial interests.66 Let us assume that the basis of L is
$400,000, and the basis of R in her remainder interest is $600,000. If
the trust's basis in its assets remains constant at $1,000,000, the basis
that L and R have in their interests will change each year as their
actuarial interest in the trust changes. So, L's basis will be reduced
each year, and R's basis will be increased. Section 273 will prevent L
from taking a depreciation deduction for her basis in her life income
interest.
Consider two alternative circumstances. In one, L and R sell their
interests in the trust to C. Secondly, consider the circumstance where
only L sells her income interest and R retains her remainder interest.
In Year Three, L sells her life income interest in the trust to C for
$450,000, and at the same time, R sells her remainder interest to C for
its value. Assume that L's basis in her life income interest at that time
was $360,000. This reduction of L's basis is not the result of
depreciation deductions since section 273 prevented L from deducting
any depreciation. The $40,000 reduction of her basis reflects the
reduction of her life expectancy and loosely represents the
distributions that L received from the trust in the intervening years.
Section 1001(e) does not prevent L from using her $360,000 basis in
measuring her gain from the sale because R sold her interest as part of
the same transaction.67 So, L will report a gain of $90,000. How should
that gain be characterized?
The $90,000 gain represents two elements. Fifty thousand dollars
of that gain is attributable to the income interest's share of the
increase in value of the assets held by the trust (in turn, the increase in
the value of the trust's assets represents the increase in income that it
65
6
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I.R.C. § 1014.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4 (1991).
I.R.C. § 1001(e)(3).
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is expected that those assets will produce).That portion of the gain is
no different from the gain recognized on the sale of shares of stock
and is just as entitled to capital gain treatment.
What about the gain that is attributable to the $40,000 of decline
in L's basis in her interest? That gain also reflects an appreciation in
the value of the trust's assets since the value of her right to income for
life declined because of her having a shorter life expectancy as each
year expired. The fact that the overall value of L's interest did not
decline shows that the value of the trust's assets increased to make up
for the actuarial reduction.
Again, there is no policy reason to treat the $90,000 gain that L
recognized on her sale as anything other than a capital gain. There is
no recapture of depreciation in that sale since L was not allowed to
take any depreciation deductions.
Finally, consider the tax treatment when L sells her life income
interest to C in Year Three for $450,000, and R retains her interest.
The only change in facts from the example above is that R did not sell
her remainder interest. In that situation, since L's interest is a term
interest, section 273 prevents L from taking a depreciation deduction,
and section 1001(e) prohibits L from using any of her basis in
determining her gain." Consequently, the entire $450,000 will be a
gain to L. How should that $450,000 gain be characterized?
You will recall from the example above that $90,000 of L's gain is
attributable to appreciation in the value of the trust's assets. Just as
L's $90,000 gain in the example above qualified as capital gain income,
so should $90,000 of L's gain qualify in this circumstance. In both
situations, $90,000 of L's gain represents appreciation of the value of
her interest in the trust and should qualify for capital gain treatment.
There is no policy justification for denying capital gain treatment to
that portion of L's gain.
What about the remaining $360,000 of L's gain? How should that
be characterized? That amount does not represent appreciation of L's
interest. To the contrary, it represents her basis, which she is
prohibited from using. Should that $360,000 of gain therefore be
treated as ordinary income? While the author concludes that capital
gain treatment is appropriate, this $360,000 item is the only one about
which there can be a serious issue.
Before examining that question, it is necessary to consider why
Congress decided not to allow L to use her basis. You will recall that
under the uniform basis rule that the tax law utilizes, the trust's basis
6

I.R.C. §§ 273, 1001(e).
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in its assets is allocated between the income beneficiary and the
remainderman according to their actuarial interests, which change
each year as the life expectancy of the life income beneficiary
declines.69 Eventually, the remainderman, R in our facts, will have
100% of the trust's basis. So, if L were allowed to use her basis when
she sold her interest, and since R would eventually obtain that same
amount of basis for herself, it could be said that the same basis would
be made available twice - once to the life income beneficiary and
again to the remainderman. That problem does not occur if the life
income beneficiary and the remainderman transfer their interests at
the same time since then the basis used by the life income beneficiary
will never end up in the hands of the remainderman or anyone else.
To cure this problem, Congress adopted section 1001(e), which
prohibits L from using her basis on the sale of her interest unless the
remainderman transfers her interest at the same time.
Congress could have solved this problem differently. They could
have barred any increase in the remainderman's basis for actuarial
changes that take place after the life income beneficiary sells her
interest. Instead, they chose to prevent the beneficiary of a term
interest from using her basis.7 Was that fair?
The division of a trust's income between a current beneficiary and
a remainderman rests on a distinction between capital and the income
it produces. The distinction between capital and income has artificial
aspects to it. Take, for example, the treatment of a current beneficiary
of a trust. One way of characterizing the distributions from a trust to a
current beneficiary is to treat all distributions as coming from the
income produced by the trust's assets that year to the extent thereof.
The tax law adopts that view in that all the income earned by the trust
in a year is allocated to the distributions made to beneficiaries that
year.72 The balance of the trust's income (if any) is taxed to the trust.
There are practical benefits to allocating the trust's income in that
manner. But the situation can be viewed quite differently.
Another reasonable view is that the several interests in the trust
can be seen as undivided interests in the trust's assets. The income
produced by those assets therefore belongs partly to the current
beneficiary and partly to the remainderman. When distributions are

6 See I.R.S. Pub. 551, Basis of Assets, http://www.irs.gov/publications/p551/
index.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
70 I.R.C. § 1001(e).
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See id.
See I.R.C. §§ 651, 661.
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made to the current beneficiary, the distribution consists partly of that
beneficiary's share of the trust's income and partly of a portion of the
trust's corpus. The portion that represents the trust's corpus would not
be taxable to the current beneficiary, but would reduce her basis. The
trust's income that is not distributed to the current beneficiary is
added to the trust's corpus and thereby increases the amount to be
distributed to the remainderman when the current beneficiary's
interest terminates. The income added to the trust's corpus would be
taxed to the trust. This approach is based on a concept that while the
amount to be distributed to the current beneficiary is equal to the
amount of the trust's income for that period, the characterization of
what was distributed is made up of both income and principle of the
trust.
Since that treatment has theoretical support, why is it not used by
the tax law in its treatment of an income interest in a trust?" There
likely are two reasons for the tax law not to have adopted that
approach.
One reason is administrative simplicity. It is much easier to
calculate the income of the several parties if all of the trust's income is
allocated to the current beneficiaries.
A second reason for the current treatment of trust distributions is
that it conforms to the general public's conception of what is taking
place. If a settlor of a trust provides that the income produced by the
trust is to be distributed to a current beneficiary, he probably
contemplates that the distribution received by the beneficiary is the
actual income produced by the trust.
Return now to the example of L who has $360,000 of income that
is attributable to not being allowed to use her basis. One could
conclude that to tax L on that $360,000 is harsh in that it actually
represents her capital, and so treating it as capital gain is a small
mitigation of the harshness of taxing her. After all, if R had
transferred her remainder interest at the same time that L made the
sale, L would not have recognized any gain for the $360,000 of the
payment she received. Taxing that amount as ordinary income to L
because R did not transfer her interest would compound that
harshness.
The reason that L recognizes $360,000 of her receipt from the sale
as a gain is that Congress made a choice in its decision to prevent an
abuse. It chose to deny L the use of her basis rather than to prevent
Congress essentially adopted this approach in the treatment provided to the
sale of a so-called stripped coupon. I.R.C. § 1286.
7
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additions to R's basis for subsequent changes in actuarial interests. It
is simpler to deny L her basis in that circumstance, and that may
explain why Congress made that choice. While achievement of
administrative simplicity may justify the tax treatment of L, it is
reasonable to allow some mitigation of the detriment she suffers
because of that treatment.
Another approach is to accept as reasonable the construction that
the beneficiaries have undivided interests in the trust. Then, a portion
of distributions that L would have received from the trust can be seen
as actually representing capital recovery even though it would have
been taxed to her as income. Taxing her on all of the gain from her
sale of her interest reinforces the failure to permit her to recover her
capital interest. Capital gain treatment for her sale provides some
mitigation.
IX. CONCLUSION

Capital gain treatment for the gain recognized on the sale of a
term interest is clearly appropriate in every situation with a possible
exception for the situation when the seller of the interest is precluded
from using her basis in measuring the gain. Even in that latter
situation, it is only as to that part of the seller's gain that is
attributable to the denial of the use of the seller's basis that there can
be a policy issue. That part of the seller's gain that is attributable to
anticipated appreciation of future income clearly conforms to the
policy reasons for allowing capital gain treatment. As to the amount
of gain attributable to the denial of the use of the seller's basis, in the
view of the author, capital gain treatment is an appropriate mitigation
of the harshness of treating that amount as a gain.
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